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Abstract
We provide an overview of the surprising results we have attained in the last decade on the identification
of quantum structures in cognition and, more specifically, in the formalization and representation of nat-
ural concepts. We firstly discuss the quantum foundational reasons that led us to investigate the mecha-
nisms of formation and combination of concepts in human mind, starting from the empirically observed
deviations from classical logical and probabilistic structures. We then develop our quantum-theoretic
perspective in Fock space which allows successful modeling of various sets of cognitive experiments
collected by different scientists, including ourselves. In addition, we formulate a unified explanatory hy-
pothesis for the presence of quantum structures in cognitive processes, and discuss our recent discovery
of further quantum aspects in concept combinations, namely, ‘entanglement’ and ‘indistinguishability’.
We finally illustrate perspectives for future research.
Keywords: Quantum structures; cognition; concept theory; human reasoning; logic; emergence.
1 The combination problem in concept theory
That concepts exhibit aspects of ‘contextuality’, ‘vagueness’ and ‘graded typicality’ was already known
in the seventies since the investigations of Eleanor Rosch [1]. These studies questioned explicitly the
traditional view that ‘concepts are containers of instantiations’ and, additionally, although not explicitly
stated, there was already the suspicion that ‘the human mind combines concepts not following the algebraic
rules of classical logic even if the combinations are conjunctions or disjunctions’. In particular, conceptual
gradeness led scholars to introduce elements of probability theory in structuring and representing concepts.
A possible way to at least preserve a set-theoretical basis was the fuzzy set approach [2]. According to
this proposal, concepts would combine in such a way that the conjunction of two concepts satisfies the
‘minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction’ and the disjunction of two concepts satisfies the ‘maximum rule
of fuzzy set disjunction’. In this way, one could still maintain that ‘concepts can be represented as (fuzzy)
sets and combine according to set-theoretic rules’. However, a whole set of experimental findings in the
last thirty years revealed that the latter does not hold, thus raising the so-called ‘combination problem’.
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(i) ‘Guppy effect’. Osherson and Smith measured the ‘typicality’ of specific exemplars with respect to
the concepts Pet and Fish and their conjunction Pet-Fish [3], and they found that people rate an exemplar
such as Guppy as a very typical example of Pet-Fish, without rating Guppy as a very typical example neither
of Pet nor of Fish (‘Pet-Fish problem’).1 Interestingly enough, this guppy effect violates the minimum rule
of fuzzy set conjunction.
(ii) ‘Overextension and underextension effects’. Hampton measured the ‘membership weight’ of several
exemplars with respect to specific pairs of concepts and their conjunction [4] and disjunction [5], finding
systematic deviations from fuzzy set modeling. Adopting his terminology, if the membership weight of
an exemplar x with respect to the conjunction ‘A and B’ of two concepts A and B is higher than the
membership weight of x with respect to one concept (both concepts), we say that the membership weight
of x is ‘overextended’ (‘double overextended’) with respect to the conjunction (briefly, x is overextended
with respect to the conjunction). If the membership weight of an exemplar x with respect to the disjunction
‘A or B’ of two concepts A and B is less than the membership weight of x with respect to one concept
(both concepts), we say that the membership weight of x is ‘underextended’ (‘double underextended’) with
respect to the disjunction (briefly, x is underextended with respect to the disjunction). We have recently
performed a similar cognitive test on conceptual conjunctions of the form ‘A and B’ [6, 7], detecting
systematic overextension and also double overextension.2
(iii) ‘Deviations from classicality in conceptual negation’. More recently, Hampton measured the mem-
bership weights of many exemplars with respect to specific pairs of concepts and their conjunction, e.g.,
Tools Which Are Also Weapons, and also conjunction when the second concept is negated, e.g., Tools Which
Are Not Weapons [8]. He detected overextension in both types of conjunctions, as well as deviations from
classical logical behaviour in conceptual negation. We have recently performed a more general cognitive
test [6, 7], detecting systematic overextension, double overextension and violation of classical logic negation
rules in conceptual conjunctions of the form ‘A and not B’, ‘not A and B’ and ‘not A and not B’.
(iv) ‘Borderline contradictions’. Alxatib and Pelletier asked human subjects to estimate the truth value
of a sentence such as “x is tall and not tall” for a given person x who was showed to the eyes of the subjects
[9]. They found that a significant number of subjects estimated such a sentence as true, in particular, for
borderline cases.3
Difficulties (i)–(iv) entail, in particular, that the formation and combination rules of human concepts
do not generally follow the laws of classical (fuzzy set) logic [3, 4, 5, 8]. Moreover, the corresponding
experimental data cannot generally be modeled in a single classical probability space satisfying the axioms
of Kolmogorov, which we proved in various articles [6, 10, 11, 12].
Our investigation of the above ‘deviations from classicality’4 in conceptual combinations can be traced
back to our studies on the axiomatic and operational foundations of quantum physics and the origins of
quantum probability (see, e.g., [13]). We recognized that any decision process, e.g., a typicality measure-
ment, or a membership estimation, involves a ‘transition from potential to actual’, in which an outcome is
actualized from a set of possible outcomes as a consequence of a contextual interaction (of a cognitive na-
ture) of the subject with the conceptual situation that is the object of the decision. Hence, human decision
processes exhibit deep analogies with what occurs in a quantum measurement process, where the mea-
1In a typicality measurement, subjects are asked to choose the exemplar they consider as the most typical example of a
given concept, hence they have to pick the best example in a list of items.
2In a membership measurement, subjects are asked to decide whether a given exemplar x is a member of a given concept
A. When many subjects are involved in the measurement, a membership weight µ(A) can be defined for x as a large number
limit of the relative frequency of positive answers.
3A borderline contradiction can be formalized as a sentence of the form P (x) ∧ ¬P (x), for a vague predicate P and a
borderline case x, e.g., the sentence “Mark is rich and Mark is not rich”.
4By the locution ‘deviation from classicality’ we actually mean that classical logical and probabilistic structures, i.e. the
most traditional models of cognition, cannot account for the experimentally observed patterns
2
surement context (of a physical nature) influences the measured quantum particle in a non-deterministic
way. Quantum probability – which is able to formalize this ‘contextually driven actualization of potential’,
not classical probability – which only formalizes lack of knowledge about actuality – can conceptually and
mathematically cope with this situation underlying both quantum and conceptual realms [14].
The second step of our research was the elaboration of a ‘State Context Property’ (SCoP) formalism
to abstractly represent any type of entity, e.g., a conceptual entity, in terms of its states, contexts and
properties. In SCoP, a concept is represented as an ‘entity being in a specific state and changing under the
influence of a cognitive context’, rather than as a ‘container of instantiations’, and we were able to provide
a quantum-theoretic model in Hilbert space that successfully describes the guppy effect [15, 16] (Section
2).
The successive development of our research was the employment of the mathematical formalism of
quantum theory in Fock space to model the overextension and underextension of membership weights
measured in [4, 5]. These effects can be described in terms of genuine quantum aspects, like ‘interfer-
ence’, ‘superposition’ and ‘emergence’ [10, 11, 17, 18]. This quantum-mechanical model was successfully
applied to describe borderline contradictions [12]. More recently, we extended the model to incorporate
conceptual negation, thus faithfully representing the above mentioned experiments by ourselves on concept
conjunctions and negations [6, 7] (Section 3).
Our results allowed us to put forward a unifying explanatory hypothesis for this whole set of experi-
mental findings in human cognition, namely, that human thought is guided by two simultaneous processes
– ‘quantum conceptual thought’, whose nature is ‘emergence’, and ‘quantum logical thought’, whose nature
is ‘logic’ [19]. Our investigations indicate that the former generally prevails over the latter, and that the
effects, paradoxes, contradictions, fallacies, experimentally detected in human cognition can be considered
as expressions of this dominance, rather than ‘biases’ of the human mind. More recently, we received a
further crucial confirmation of this two-layered structure in human thought, namely the stability of the
deviation from classical probabilistic rules we detected in [7] (Section 4).
Our quantum-theoretic perspective also accounts for two recent experimental results we obtained,
namely, the identification of ‘quantum entanglement’ in the conceptual combination The Animal Acts
[20, 21] (Section 5) and the detection of ‘quantum indistinguishability of Bose-Einstein type’ in specific
combinations of identical concepts, such as Eleven Animals [22] (Section 6). These discoveries are also
important, in our opinion, from the point of view of the foundations of quantum physics, since they can
shed new light on two mysterious aspects of the microscopic world – entanglement and indistinguishability.
In this review article, we present the above results by basically following a historical reconstruction,
though justified and restructured in a unitary and more general rational framework. We conclude our paper
with some epistemological remarks on the role and interpretation of our quantum-theoretic perspective
within the domain of cognitive modeling, and with some hints for future developments (Section 7).
2 The first steps: potentiality and contextuality in decision processes
The first move towards the development of a quantum-theoretic perspective in cognition came from our
former research on the mathematical and conceptual foundations of quantum physics. In particular, we
were guided by our studies on:
(i) the identification of quantum structures outside the microscopic world, e.g., in the cognitive situation
of the liar paradox [23, 24];
(ii) the recognition of the existence of deep analogies between quantum particles and conceptual entities
with respect to ‘potentiality’ and ‘contextuality’;
(iii) the role played by quantum probability in formalizing experimental situations where these aspects
of potentiality and contextuality occur.
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It is well known from quantum physics that, in a quantum measurement process, the measurement
context influences the quantum entity that is measured in a non-deterministic way, actualizing one outcome
in a set of possible measurement outcomes, as a consequence of the interaction between the quantum
entity and the measurement context. Suppose now that a statistics of measurement outcomes is collected
after a sequence of many repeated measurement processes on an arbitrary entity, and such that (i) the
measurement actualises properties of the entity that were not actual before the measurement started, (ii)
different outcomes and actualisations are obtained probabilistically. What type of probability can formalize
such experimental situation? It cannot be classical probability, because classical probability formalizes lack
of knowledge about actual properties of the entity that were already actual before the measurement started.
We proved many years ago that a situation where context actualizes potential properties can instead be
represented in a suitable quantum probabilistic framework [13].
What about a human decision process? Well, we realized that a decision process is generally made in a
state of genuine potentiality, which is not of the type of a lack of knowledge of an actuality. The following
example may help to illustrate this point. In [14], we considered a survey including the question “are
you a smoker or not?”. Suppose that 21 participants over a whole sample of 100 participants answered
‘yes’ to this question. We can then consider 0.21 as the probability of finding a smoker in this sample of
participants. However, this probability is obviously of the type of a ‘lack of knowledge about an actuality’,
because each participant ‘is’ a smoker or ‘is not’ a smoker before the property has been tested, hence before
the experiment to test it – the survey – starts. Suppose that we now consider the question “are you for
or against the use of nuclear energy?”, and that 31 participants answer they are in favor. In this case, the
resulting probability 0.31 is ‘not’ of the type of ‘lack of knowledge about an actuality’. Indeed, it is very
plausible for this type of question that some of the participants had no opinion about it before the survey,
and hence for these participants the outcome was influenced by the context at the time the question was
asked, including the specific conceptual structure of how the question was formulated. This is how context
plays an essential role whenever the human mind is concerned with outcomes of experiments of a cognitive
nature. We showed that the first type of probability, i.e. the type that models a ‘lack of knowledge about
an actuality’, is classical, and that the second type is non-classical and, possibly, quantum [13].
The effect due to role that context plays on a conceptual entity is equally fundamental than the effect
due to the actualizing of potentialities during a decision process. Exactly as in a quantum measurement
the measurement context changes the state of the quantum entity that is measured, in a decision process
the cognitive context changes the state of the concept [15, 16]. For example, in our modeling of the concept
Pet, we considered the context e expressed by Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains that he is a
weird person, and found that when participants in an experiment were asked to rate different exemplars of
Pet, the scores for Snake and Spider were very high in this context. In our perspective, this is explained by
the existence of different states for the concept Pet, where we use the notion of ‘state’ in the same way as
it is used in quantum theory, but also as it is used in ordinary language, i.e. ‘the state of affairs’, meaning
‘how the affairs will react on different measurement contexts. We call ‘the state of Pet when no specific
context is present’, its ground state pˆ. The context e then changes the ground state pˆ into a new state
pweird person pet. Typicality, in our perspective, is an observable semantic quantity, which means that it
takes different values in different states. Hence, in our perspective the typicality variations as encountered
in the guppy effect are due to changes of state of the concept Pet under influence of a context. More
specifically, the conjunction Pet-Fish is Pet under the context Fish, in which case the ground state p of Pet
is changed into a new state pF ish. The typicality of Guppy, being an observable semantic quantity, will be
different depending on the state, and this explains the high typicality of Guppy in the state pF ish of Pet,
and its normal typicality in the ground state p of Pet [15].
We developed this approach in a formal way, and called the underlying mathematical structure a ‘State
Context Property’ (SCoP) system [15]. To build SCoP for an arbitrary concept S we introduce three
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sets, namely, the set Σ of states, denoting states by p, q, . . ., the set M of contexts, denoting contexts by
e, f, . . ., and the set L of properties, denoting properties by a, b, . . .. The ‘ground state’ pˆ of the concept
S is the state where S is not under the influence of any particular context. Whenever S is under the
influence of a specific context e, a change of the state of S occurs. In case S was in its ground state pˆ, the
ground state changes to a state p. The difference between states pˆ and p is manifested, for example, by the
typicality values of different exemplars of the concept, and the applicability values of different properties
being different in the two states pˆ and p. Hence, to complete the mathematical construction of SCoP, also
two functions µ and ν are introduced. The function µ : Σ×M×Σ −→ [0, 1] is defined such that µ(q, e, p)
is the probability that state p of concept S under the influence of context e changes to state q of concept S.
The function ν : Σ×L −→ [0, 1] is defined such that ν(p, a) is the weight, or normalization of applicability,
of property a in state p of concept S. With these mathematical structures and tools the SCoP formalism
copes with both ‘contextual typicality’ and ‘contextual applicability’.
We likewise built an explicit quantum-mechanical representation in a complex Hilbert space of the data
of the experiment on Pet and Fish and different states of Pet and Fish in different contexts explored in
[15], as well as of the concept Pet-Fish [16]. In this way, we were able to cope with the pet-fish problem
illustrated in Section 1, (i).
The analysis above already contained the seeds of our quantum modeling perspective for concept
combinations – in particular, the notion of state of a concept marked the departure from the traditional
idea of a concept as a set, eventually fuzzy, that contains instantiations. However, this analysis was still
preliminary, and a general quantum-mechanical modeling required further experimental and theoretic steps,
as it will be clear from the following section.
3 Modeling concept combinations in Fock space
We present here our quantum modeling perspective in Fock space for the combination of two concepts.
It is successful in describing the classically problematical results illustrated in Section 1, (ii) (concept
conjunction and disjunction), (iii) (concept negation) and (iv) (borderline contradictions).
Let us firstly consider the membership weights of exemplars of concepts and their conjunctions/disjunctions
measured by Hampton [4, 5]. He identified systematic deviations from classical (fuzzy) set conjunc-
tions/disjunctions, an effect known as ‘overextension’ or ‘underextension’ (see Section 1). We showed
in [10] that a large part of Hampton’s data cannot be modeled in a classical probability space satisfy-
ing the axioms of Kolmogorov [25, 26]. For example, the exemplar Mint scored in [4] the membership
weight µ(A) = 0.87 with respect to the concept Food, µ(B) = 0.81 with respect to the concept Plant, and
µ(A and B) = 0.9 with respect to their conjunction Food And Plant. Thus, the exemplar Mint exhibits
overextension with respect to the conjunction Food And Plant of the concepts Food and Plant, and no clas-
sical probability representation exists for these data. More generally, the membership weights µ(A), µ(B)
and µ(A and B) of the exemplar x with respect to concepts A, B and their conjunction ‘A and B’, respec-
tively, can be represented in a classical Kolmogorovian probability model if and only if they satisfy the
following inequalities [6, 10]
µ(A and B)−min(µ(A), µ(B)) ≤ 0 (1)
µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A and B) ≤ 1 (2)
A violation of (1) entails, in particular, that the minimum rule of fuzzy set conjunction does not hold,
as in the case of Mint. A similar situation occurs in the case of disjunctions. We showed in [10] that
a large part of Hampton’s data cannot be modeled in a classical Kolmogorovian probability space. For
example, the exemplar Sunglasses scored in [5] the membership weight µ(A) = 0.4 with respect to the
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concept Sportswear, µ(B) = 0.2 with respect to the concept Sports Equipment, and µ(A or B) = 0.1
with respect to their disjunction Sportswear Or Sports Equipment. Thus, the exemplar Sunglasses exhibits
underextension with respect to the disjunction Sportswear Or Sports Equipment of the concepts Sportswear
and Sports Equipment, and no classical probability representation exists for these data. More generally,
the membership weights µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B) of the exemplar x with respect to concepts A, B and
their disjunction ‘A or B’, respectively, can be represented in a classical Kolmogorovian probability model
if and only if they satisfy the following inequalities [10]
max(µ(A), µ(B)) − µ(A or B) ≤ 0 (3)
0 ≤ µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B) (4)
A violation of (3) entails, in particular, that the maximum rule of fuzzy set disjunction does not hold, as
in the case of Sunglasses.
In a first attempt to elaborate a quantum mathematics model for the data in [4] and [5] we were inspired
by the quantum two-slit experiment.5 Consider, for example, the disjunction of two concepts. This led
us to suggest the following Hilbert space model. One could represent the concepts A and B by the unit
vectors |A〉 and |B〉, respectively, of a Hilbert space H, and describe the decision measurement of a subject
estimating whether the exemplar x is a member of A by means of a dichotomic observable represented by the
orthogonal projection operatorM . The probabilities µ(A) and µ(B) that x is chosen as a member of A and
B, i.e. its membership weights, are given by the scalar products µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 and µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉,
respectively. The concept ‘A or B’ is instead represented by the normalized superposition 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉)
in H. If |A〉 and |B〉 are chosen to be orthogonal, that is, 〈A|B〉 = 0, the membership weights µ(A), µ(B)
and µ(A or B) of an exemplar x for the concepts A, B and ‘A or B’ are given by
µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 (5)
µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉 (6)
µ(A or B) =
1
2
(µ(A) + µ(B)) + ℜ〈A|M |B〉 (7)
respectively, where ℜ〈A|M |B〉 is the real part of the complex number 〈A|M |B〉. The term ℜ〈A|M |B〉 is
called ‘interference term’ in the quantum jargon, since it produces a deviation from the average 12(µ(A) +
µ(B)) which would have been observed in the quantum two-slit experiment in absence of interference. In
this way, the deviation from classicality in [4, 5] would be due to quantum interference, superposition and
emergence, exactly as quantum interference, superposition and emergence are responsible of the deviation
from the classically expected pattern in the two-slit experiment.
This ‘emergence-based’ model in Hilbert space succeeded in describing many non-classical situations
in [4] and [5]. However, it did not work for various cases, and these were exactly the cases where logic
seemed to play a role in the mechanism of conceptual combination. This led us to work out a more general
model in Fock space. We present the model in the following. We omit proofs and technical details in the
following, for the sake of brevity, inviting the interested reader to refer to the bibliography quoted in this
section.
In the case of two combining entities, a Fock space F consists of two sectors: ‘sector 1’ is a Hilbert
space H, while ‘sector 2’ is a tensor product H ⊗ H of two isomorphic versions of H. It can be proved
that a quantum probability model in Fock space exists for Hampton’s data on conjunction and disjunction
[10, 11].
5In the present paper we use for our modeling purposes the standard quantum-mechanical formalism that is presented in
modern manuals of quantum physics (see, e.g., [27]). A basic summary of this formalism is contained in the volume including
this article [28].
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Let us start with the conjunction of two concepts. Let x be an exemplar and let µ(A), µ(B) and
µ(A and B) be the membership weights of x with respect to the concepts A, B and ‘A and B’, respectively.
Let F = H ⊕ (H ⊗ H) be the Fock space where we represent the conceptual entities. The states of the
concepts A, B and ‘A and B′ are represented by the unit vectors |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and |A and B〉 ∈ F ,
respectively, where
|A and B〉 = meiλ|A〉 ⊗ |B〉+ neiν 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉) (8)
The superposition vector 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉) describes ‘A and B’ as a new emergent concept, while the product
vector |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 describes ‘A and B’ in terms of concepts A and B. The positive numbers m and n are
such that m2 + n2 = 1. The decision measurement of a subject who estimates the membership of the
exemplar x with respect to the concept ‘A and B’ is represented by the orthogonal projection operator
M ⊕ (M ⊗M) on F , where M is an orthogonal projection operator on H. Hence, the membership weight
of x with respect to ‘A and B’ is given by
µ(A and B) = 〈A and B|M ⊕ (M ⊗M)|A and B〉
= m2µ(A)µ(B) + n2
(
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ ℜ〈A|M |B〉
)
(9)
where µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 and µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉 as above. The term ℜ〈A|M |B〉 is again the interference
term of quantum theory. A solution of (9) exists in the Fock space C3 ⊕ (C3 ⊗C3) where this interference
term is given by
ℜ〈A|M |B〉 =
{ √
1− µ(A)
√
1− µ(B) cos θ if µ(A) + µ(B) > 1√
µ(A)
√
µ(B) cos θ if µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1 (10)
(θ is the ‘interference angle’). Coming to the example above, namely, the exemplar Mint with respect to
Food, Plant and Food And Plant, we have that (9) is satisfied with m2 = 0.3, n2 = 0.7 and θ = 50.21◦.
The previous mathematical representation admits the following interpretation. Whenever a subject is
asked to estimate whether a given exemplar x belongs to the concepts A, B, ‘A and B’, two mechanisms
act simultaneously and in superposition in the subject’s thought. A ‘quantum logical thought’, which is a
probabilistic version of the classical logical reasoning, where the subject considers two copies of exemplar
x and estimates whether the first copy belongs to A and the second copy of x belongs to B, and further
the probabilistic version of the conjunction is applied to both estimates. But also a ‘quantum conceptual
thought’ acts, where the subject estimates whether the exemplar x belongs to the newly emergent concept
‘A and B’. The place whether these superposed processes can be suitably structured is Fock space. Sector
1 hosts the latter process, while sector 2 hosts the former, while the weights m2 and n2 measure the ‘degree
of participation’ of sectors 2 and 1, respectively, in the case of conjunction. In the case of Mint, subjects
consider Mint to be more strongly a member of the concept Food And Plant, than they consider it to be
a member of Food or of Plant. This is an effect due to a strong presence of quantum conceptual thought,
the newly formed concept Food And Plant being found to be a better fitting category for Mint than the
original concepts Food or Plant. And indeed, in the case of Mint, considering the values of n2 and m2, the
combination process mainly occurs in sector 1 of Fock space, which means that emergence prevails over
logic.
Let us now come to the disjunction of two concepts. Let x be an exemplar and let µ(A), µ(B) and
µ(A or B) be the membership weights of x with respect to the concepts A, B and ‘A or B’, respectively.
Let F = H ⊕ (H ⊗H) be the Fock space where we represent the conceptual entities. The concepts A, B
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and ‘A or B’ are represented by the unit vectors |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and |A or B〉 ∈ F , respectively, where
|A or B〉 = meiλ|A〉 ⊗ |B〉+ neiν 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉) (11)
The superposition vector 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉) describes ‘A or B’ as a new emergent concept, while the product
vector |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 describes ‘A or B’ in terms of concepts A and B. The positive numbers m and n are
such that m2 + n2 = 1, and they estimate the ‘degree of participation’ of sectors 2 and 1, respectively,
in the disjunction case. The decision measurement of a subject who estimates the membership of the
exemplar x with respect to the concept ‘A or B’ is represented by the orthogonal projection operator
M ⊕ (M ⊗ 1+ 1⊗M −M ⊗M) on F , where M has been introduced above. We notice that
M ⊗ 1+ 1⊗M −M ⊗M = 1− (1−M)⊗ (1−M) (12)
that is, we have applied de Morgan’s laws of logic in sector 2 of Fock space in the transition from conjunction
to disjunction. The membership weight of x with respect to ‘A or B’ is given by
µ(A or B) = 〈A or B|M ⊕ (M ⊗ 1+ 1⊗M −M ⊗M)|A or B〉
m2 (µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A)µ(B)) + n2
(
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ ℜ〈A|M |B〉
)
(13)
where µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 and µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉. The term ℜ〈A|M |B〉 is the interference term. A solution
of (13) exists in C3 ⊕ (C3 ⊗ C3) where this interference term is given by
ℜ〈A|M |B〉 =
{ √
1− µ(A)√1− µ(B) cos θ if µ(A) + µ(B) > 1√
µ(A)
√
µ(B) cos θ if µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1 (14)
Coming to the example above, namely, the exemplar Sunglasses with respect to Sportswear, Sports Equip-
ment and Sportswear Or Sports Equipment, we have that (13) is satisfied with m2 = 0.03, n2 = 0.97 and
θ = 155.00◦.
The previous mathematical representation admits the following interpretation. Whenever a subject is
asked to estimate whether a given exemplar x belongs to the concepts A, B, ‘A or B’, two mechanisms
act simultaneously and in superposition in the subject’s thought. A ‘quantum logical thought’, which is a
probabilistic version of the classical logical reasoning, where the subject considers two copies of exemplar
x and estimates whether the first copy belongs to A or the second copy of x belongs to B, and further
the probabilistic version of the disjunction is applied to both estimates. And also a ‘quantum conceptual
thought’ acts, where the subject estimates whether the exemplar x belongs to the newly emergent concept
‘A or B’. The place whether these superposed processes are structured is again Fock space. Sector 1 hosts
the latter process, while sector 2 hosts the former, while the weights m2 and n2 measure the ‘degree of
participation’ of sectors 2 and 1, respectively, in the case of disjunction. In the case of Sunglasses, subjects
consider Sunglasses to be less strongly a member of the concept Sportswear Or Sports Equipment, than they
consider it to be a member of Sportswear or of Sports Equipment. This is an effect due to a strong presence
of quantum conceptual thought, the newly formed concept Sportswear Or Sports Equipment being found
to be a less well fitting category for Sunglasses than the original concepts Sportswear or Sports Equipment.
And indeed, in the case of Sunglasses, considering the values of n2 and m2, the combination process mainly
occurs in sector 1 of Fock space, which means that emergence aspects prevails over logical aspects in the
reasoning process.
Let us then analyze the experiment of Alxatib and Pelletier on borderline contradictions [9]. We
proved in [12] that our quantum-theoretic model for the conjunction correctly represents the collected
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data. Suppose that a large sample of human subjects is asked to estimate the truth values of the sentences
“John is tall”, “John is not tall” and “John is tall and not tall”, for a given subject John showed to the eyes
of the subjects. And suppose that the fractions of positive answers are 0.01, 0.95 and 0.15, respectively
[9]. This ‘borderline case’ is clearly problematical from a classical logical perspective, and can be modeled
in terms of overextension. Indeed, let us denote by µ(A), µ(A′) and µ(A and A′) the probabilities that the
sentences “John is tall”, “John is not tall” and “John is tall and not tall” are true, and interpret them as
membership weights of the exemplar John with respect to the concepts Tall, Not Tall and Tall And Not
Tall, respectively. Then (9) is solved for m2 = 0.77, n2 = 0.23 and θ = 0◦ [12]. The explanation of this
behaviour is that the reasoning process of the subject mainly occurs in sector 2 of Fock space, hence logical
reasoning is dominant, although emergent reasoning is also present, and it is its presence which evoked the
name ‘contradiction’ for this situation.
Let us finally come to the experiments on conceptual negation. The first studies on the negation of
natural concepts were also performed by Hampton [8]. He tested membership weights on conceptual con-
junctions of the form Tools Which Are Not Weapons, finding overextension and deviations from Boolean
behaviour in the negation. We recently performed a more general cognitive test inquiring into the mem-
bership weights of exemplars with respect to conjunctions of the form Fruits And Vegetables, Fruits And
Not Vegetables, Not Fruits And Vegetables and Not Fruits And Not Vegetables [6, 7]. Our data confirmed
significant deviations from classicality and evidenced a very stable pattern of such deviations from the
classicality conditions. The data could very faithfully be represented in two-sector Fock space, thus provid-
ing support to our quantum-theoretic modeling. More, they allowed us to attain new fundamental results
in concept research and to sustain and corroborate our explanatory hypothesis in Section 4. Hence, it is
worth to briefly review our recent results starting from the conditions for classicality of conceptual data
sets, i.e. representability of empirical membership weights in a Kolmogorovian probability space.
Let µ(A), µ(B), µ(A′), µ(B′), µ(A and B), µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B), and µ(A′ and B′) be the mem-
bership weights of an exemplar x with respect to the concepts A, B, their negations ‘not A’, ‘not B’ and
the conjunctions ‘A and B’, ‘A and not B’, ‘not A and B’ and ‘not A and not B’, respectively, and suppose
that all these membership weights are contained in the interval [0, 1] (which they will be in case they are
experimentally determined as limits of relative frequencies of respective memberships). Then, they are
‘classical conjunction data’ if and only if they satisfy the following conditions.
µ(A) = µ(A and B) + µ(A and B′) (15)
µ(B) = µ(A and B) + µ(A′ and B) (16)
µ(A′) = µ(A′ and B′) + µ(A′ and B) (17)
µ(B′) = µ(A′ and B′) + µ(A and B′) (18)
µ(A and B) + µ(A and B′) + µ(A′ and B) + µ(A′ and B′) = 1 (19)
(see [7] for the proof).
A large amount of data collected in [7] violates very strongly and also very systematically (15)–(19),
hence these data cannot be generally reproduced in a classical Kolmogorovian probability framework. It can
instead be shown that almost all these data can be represented by using our quantum-theoretic modeling
in two-sector Fock space, as above. For the sake of simplicity, let us work out separate representations for
the two sectors.
Let us start from sector 1 of Fock space, which models genuine emergence. We represent the concepts
A, B and their negations ‘not A’, ‘not B’ by the mutually orthogonal unit vectors |A〉, |B〉 and |A′〉,
|B′〉, respectively, in the individual Hilbert space H. The corresponding membership weights for a given
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exemplar x are then given by the quantum probabilistic Born rule
µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉 (20)
µ(A′) = 〈A′|M |A′〉 µ(B′) = 〈B′|M |B′〉 (21)
in sector 1. The conjunctions ‘A and B’, ‘A and not B’, ‘not A and B’, and ‘not A and not B’ are
represented by the superposition vectors 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉), 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B′〉), 1√
2
(|A′〉+ |B〉) and 1√
2
(|A′〉+ |B′〉),
respectively, in H, i.e. sector 1 of Fock space, which expresses the fact ‘A and B’, ‘A and not B’, ‘not A
and B’, and ‘not A and not B’ are considered as newly emergent concepts in sector 1.
Let us come to sector 2 of Fock space, which models logical reasoning. Here we introduce a new element,
expressing an insight which we had not yet in our earlier application of Fock space [6, 10, 11, 12], and
which we explain in detail in [7]. In short it comes to ‘taking into account that possibly A and B are
meaning-connected and hence their probability weights mutually dependent’. If this is the case, we cannot
represent, e.g., the conjunction ‘A and B’ by the tensor product vector |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 of H ⊗H. This would
indeed entail that the membership weight for the conjunction is µ(A and B) = µ(A)µ(B) in sector 2, that
is, probabilistic independence between the membership estimations of A and B. We instead, following this
new insight, represent the conjunction ‘A and B’ by an arbitrary vector |C〉 ∈ H⊗H, in sector 2, which in
general will be entangled if A and B are meaning dependent. If we represent the decision measurements
of a subject estimating the membership of the exemplar x with respect to the concepts A and B by the
orthogonal projection operators M ⊗ 1 and 1⊗M , respectively, we have
µ(A) = 〈C|M ⊗ 1|C〉 µ(B) = 〈C|1⊗M |C〉 (22)
in sector 2. We have now to formalize the fact that this sector 2 has to express logical relationships between
the concepts. More explicitly, the decision measurements of a subject estimating the membership of the
exemplar x with respect to the negations ‘not A’ and ‘not B’ should be represented by the orthogonal
projection operators (1−M)⊗ 1 and 1⊗ (1−M), respectively, in sector 2, in such a way that
µ(A′) = 1− µ(A) = 〈C|(1−M)⊗ 1|C〉 µ(B′) = 1− µ(B) = 〈C|1⊗ (1−M |C〉) (23)
in this sector.
Interestingly enough, there is a striking connection between logic and classical probability when con-
junction and negation of concepts are at stake. Namely, the logical probabilistic structure of sector 2 of
Fock space sets the limits of classical probabilistic models, and vice versa. In other words, if the experi-
mentally collected membership weights µ(A), µ(B), µ(A′), µ(B′), µ(A and B), µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B)
and µ(A′ and B′) can be represented in sector 2 of Fock space for a given choice of the state vector |C〉 and
the decision measurement projection operator M , then the membership weights satisfy (15)–(19), hence
they are classical data. Vice versa, if µ(A), µ(B), µ(A′), µ(B′), µ(A and B), µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B)
and µ(A′ and B′) satisfy (15)–(19), hence they are classical data, then an entangled state vector |C〉 and
a decision measurement projection operator M can always be found such that µ(A), µ(B), µ(A′), µ(B′),
µ(A and B), µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B) and µ(A′ and B′) can be represented in sector 2 of Fock space (see
[7] for the proof).
Let us finally come to the general representation in two-sector Fock space. We can now introduce
the general form of the vector representing the state of the conjunction of the concepts A,B and their
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respective negations.
|ΨAB〉 = mABeiλAB |C〉+ nABe
iνAB
√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉) (24)
|ΨAB′〉 = mAB′eiλAB′ |C〉+ nAB
′eiνAB′√
2
(|A〉+ |B′〉) (25)
|ΨA′B〉 = mA′BeiλA′B |C〉+ nA
′Be
iνA′B√
2
(|A′〉+ |B〉) (26)
|ΨA′B′〉 = mA′B′eiλA′B′ |C〉+ nA
′B′e
iνA′B′√
2
(|A′〉+ |B′〉) (27)
where m2XY + n
2
XY = 1, X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′. The corresponding membership weights µ(A and B),
µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B) and µ(A′ and B′) can be written as in (9). We proved in [7] that they can be
expressed in the Fock space C8 ⊕ (C8 ⊗ C8) as
µ(A and B) = m2ABαAB + n
2
AB(
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ βAB cosφAB) (28)
µ(A and B′) = m2AB′αAB′ + n
2
AB′(
µ(A) + µ(B′)
2
+ βAB′ cosφAB′) (29)
µ(A′ and B) = m2A′BαA′B + n
2
A′B(
µ(A′) + µ(B)
2
+ βA′B cosφA′B) (30)
µ(A′ and B′) = m2A′B′αA′B′ + n
2
A′B′(
µ(A′) + µ(B′)
2
+ βA′B′ cosφA′B′) (31)
where 0 ≤ αXY ≤ 1, −1 ≤ βXY ≤ 1, X = A,A′, Y = B,B′.
Let us consider a relevant example, Goldfish, with respect to (Pets, Farmyard Animals) (big overex-
tension in all experiments, but also double overextension with respect to Not Pets And Farmyard Ani-
mals). Goldfish scored µ(A) = 0.93 with respect to Pets, µ(B) = 0.17 with respect to Farmyard An-
imals, µ(A′) = 0.12 with respect to Not Pets, µ(B′) = 0.81 with respect to Not Farmyard Animals,
µ(A and B) = 0.43 with respect to Pets And Farmyard Animals, µ(A and B′) = 0.91 with respect to Pets
And Not Farmyard Animals, µ(A′ and B) = 0.18 with respect to Not Pets And Farmyard Animals, and
µ(A′ and B′) = 0.43 with respect to Not Pets And Not Farmyard Animals. A complete modeling in the
Fock space satisfying Eqs. (28), (29), (30) and (31) is characterized by coefficients:
(i) interference angles φAB = 78.9
◦, φAB′ = 43.15◦, φA′B = 54.74◦ and φA′B′ = 77.94◦;
(ii) coefficents αAB = 0.12, αAB′ = 0.8, αA′B = 0.05 and αA′B′ = 0.03;
(iii) coefficients βAB = −0.24, βAB′ = 0.10, βA′B = 0.12 and βA′B′ = 0.30;
(iv) convex weights mAB = 0.45, nAB = 0.89, mAB′ = 0.45, nAB′ = 0.9, mA′B = 0.48, nA′B = 0.88,
mA′B′ = 0.45, and nA′B′ = 0.89.
Following our interpretation in the case of conjunction and disjunction, we can say that, whenever a
subject is asked to estimate whether a given exemplar x belongs to the concepts A, B, ‘A and not B’, both
quantum logical and quantum conceptual thought simultaneously act in the subject’s thought. According
to the former, the subject considers two copies of x and estimates whether the first copy belongs to A
and the second copy of x does not belong to B. According to the latter, the subject estimates whether
the exemplar x belongs to the newly emergent concept ‘A and not B’. Fock space naturally captures this
two-layered structure.
11
4 A unifying explanatory hypothesis
The Fock space modeling presented in the previous section suggested us to formulate a general hypothe-
sis which justifies and explains a whole set of empirical results on cognitive psychology under a unifying
theoretic scheme [19]. According to our explanatory hypothesis, human reasoning is a specifically struc-
tured superposition of two processes, a ‘logical reasoning’ and an ‘emergent reasoning’. Logical reasoning
combines cognitive entities – concepts, combinations of concepts, or propositions – by applying the rules
of logic, though generally in a probabilistic way. Emergent reasoning enables instead formation of com-
bined cognitive entities as newly emerging entities – in the case of concepts, new concepts, in the case
of propositions, new propositions – carrying new meaning, connected with the meaning of the component
cognitive entities, but with a connection not defined by the algebra of logic. These two mechanisms act
simultaneously in human thought during a reasoning process, the first one is guided by an algebra of ‘logic’,
the second one follows a mechanism of ‘emergence’.
Human reasoning can be mathematically formalized in the two-sector Fock space presented in Section
3. The states of conceptual entities are represented by unit vectors of this Fock space as we have seen in
the specific case of concept combinations. More specifically, ‘sector 1 of Fock space’ models ‘conceptual
emergence’, hence the combination of two concepts is represented by a superposition vector of the vectors
representing the component concepts in this Hilbert space, allowing ‘quantum interference’ between con-
ceptual entities to play a role in the process of emergence. ‘Sector 2 of Fock space’ models a conceptual
combination from the combining concepts by requiring the rules of logic for the logical connective used for
the combining, i.e. conjunction or disjunction, to be satisfied in a probabilistic setting. This quantum-
theoretic modeling suggested us to call ‘quantum conceptual thought’ the process occurring in sector 1
of Fock space, ‘quantum logical thought’ the process occurring in sector 2. The relative importance of
emergence or logic in a specific cognitive process is measured by the ‘degree of participation’ of sectors 1
and 2.
The abundance of evidence of deviations from classical logical reasoning in concrete human decisions
(paradoxes, fallacies, effects, contradictions), together with our results in these two sections, led us to
draw the conclusion that emergence constitutes the dominant dynamics of human reasoning, while logic is
only a secondary structure. Therefore, we put forward the view that the aforementioned deviations from
classicality are a consequence of the dominant dynamics and their nature is emergence, while classical
logical reasoning is not a default to deviate from but, rather, a consequence of a secondary structure and
its nature is logic.
There is further empirical evidence revealing that what primarily guides human subjects in concrete
human decisions is emergent reasoning, but logical aspects are likewise present.
A first element of evidence we identified by comparing the behavior of experimental data of different
experiments. Consider, e.g., the exemplar Olive and its membership weights with respect to the concepts
Fruits, Vegetables and their conjunction Fruits And Vegetables, measured by ourselves [6, 7], and its mem-
bership weights with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and their disjunction Fruits Or Vegetables,
measured by Hampton [5]. Olive scored µ(A) = 0.56 with respect to Fruits, µ(B) = 0.63 with respect
to Vegetables and µ(A and B) = 0.65 with respect to Fruits And Vegetables, that is, Olive was double
overextended with respect to the conjunction. But, Olive was also double overextended with respect to
the disjunction, since it scored µ(A) = 0.5 with respect to Fruits, µ(B) = 0.1 with respect to Vegetables
and µ(A or B) = 0.8 with respect to Fruits Or Vegetables. Our interpretation of these Olive case is the
following. People see Olive as an exemplar which could be considered to be a fruit, but also could be
considered to be a vegetable. Hence it could also, and even more so, be considered to be both, a fruit ‘and’
a vegetable. This explains the double overextension of Olive with respect to the conjunction. This way of
looking at Olive gives indeed the necessary weight to the conjunction to produce a double overextension.
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Equally so, people see Olive as an exemplar which induces doubt about whether it is a vegetable or whether
it is a fruit. Hence its could also, and even more so, be considered to be a ’fruit or a vegetable’. This
explains the double overextension of Olive with respect to the disjunction. This way of looking at Olive
gives indeed the necessary weight to the disjunction to produce a very big double overextension. Let us
remark indeed that a double overextention with respect to the disjunction does not necessarily violates
the classicality conditions, on the contrary, for a classical probability, the disjunction should be double
overextended. For Olive the overextension is however so big that another one of the classicality conditions,
namely the one linked to the Kolmogorovian factor is violated. For a classical probability model we have
µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B) = µ(A and B), which means 0 ≤ µ(A) + µ(B)− µ(A or B). However, for Olive
we have µ(A)+µ(B)−µ(A or B) = 0.5+0.1−0.8 = −0.2 < 0, which shows that the double overextension
for the disjunction in the case of Olive is of a non-classical nature. How come that Olive can give such
weight to both conjunction and disjunction, although conjunction and disjunction are considered in clas-
sical probability to be distinctly different? It is because the meaning of Olive plays dominantly in sector
1, were quantum conceptual structures exist, and both connectives, ‘and’ and ‘or’ quite well resemble each
other in this realm of conceptuality.
The second empirical evidence became manifest when we calculated the deviations from (15)–(19) across
all exemplars in our experiment in [6, 7], and we noticed that these deviations have approximately constant
numerical values. Indeed, let us introduce the following quantities.
IABA′B′ = 1− µ(A and B)− µ(A and B′)− µ(A′ and B)− µ(A′ and B′) (32)
IA = µ(A)− µ(A and B)− µ(A and B′) (33)
IB = µ(B)− µ(A and B)− µ(A′ and B) (34)
IA′ = µ(A
′)− µ(A′ and B′)− µ(A′ and B) (35)
IB′ = µ(B
′)− µ(A′ and B′)− µ(A and B′) (36)
We were very excited ourselves to find that for every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, IX , IY and IABA′B′ are
constant functions across all exemplars, because this constitutes a very strong experimental evidence for
the non-classical nature of what happens during concept combinations. More concretely, the last four
equations give rise to values between 0, which would be the classical value, and −0.5, but substantially
closer to −0.5 than to 0, and the fifth equation gives rise to a value between 0, which again would be
the classical value, and −1, but closer to −1 than to 0. This is very strong evidence for the presence of
non-classicality, indeed, if the classicality conditions are violated in such a strong and systematical way,
the underlying structure cannot in any way be classical. To test the rugularity of this violation we firstly
performed a ‘linear regression analysis’ of the data to check whether these quantities can be represented
by a line of the form y = mx+ q, with m = 0. This was the case. For IA, we obtained m = 3.0 · 10−3 with
R2 = 0.94; for IB , we obtained m = 2.9 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.93; for IA′ , we obtained m = 2.6 · 10−3 with
R2 = 0.96; for IB′ , we obtained m = 3.1 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.98; for IABA′B′ , we obtained m = 4 · 10−3 with
R2 = 0.92. Secondly, we computed the 95%-confidence interval for these parameters and obtained interval
(−0.51,−0.33) for IA, interval (−0.42,−0.28) for IA′ , interval (−0.52,−0.34) for IB, interval (−0.40,−0.26)
for IB′ , and interval (−0.97,−0.64) for IABA′B′ . This means that the measured parameters systematically
fall within a narrow band centered at very similar values. Next to the very strong experimental evidence
for the non-classical nature of the underlying structure, the finding of this very stable pattern of violation
constitutes also strong evidence for the validity of our Fock space model, and for the dominance of emergent
reasoning with respect to logical reasoning when concepts are combined. Indeed, suppose for a moment
that we substitute in the place of the experimental values in our equations to test classicality, the values
that would be obtained theoretically in case we apply the first sector of Fock space equation of our Fock
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space model. Since interference in this equation can be negative as well as positive, and there is a priori
no reason to suppose that there would be more of the one than the other, we can neglect the interference
parts of the equation, since it is reasonable to suppose that they will cancel out when summing on all
the terms of the equations of our classicality conditions. This means that we get the following, for every
X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, we have µ(X and Y ) = 12(µ(X) + µ(Y )) (see (28)–(31)). A simple calculation
shows that, for every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, IX = IY = −0.5 and IABA′B′ = −1, in this case. These are
exactly the values to which our experimental violations are close, which means that are Fock space model
captures the underlying structures in a systematic and deep way. The experimental values are in between
these values, and 0. which is the classical value, which means that also logical reasoning is present, but
the emergent reasoning is dominant.
We think that these two results confirm, on one side, the general validity of our quantum-theoretic
perspective in cognition and, on the other side, they constitute a very strong experimental support to the
explanatory hypothesis presented in this section.
The next two sections complete our overview on the identification of quantum structures in concept
combination, also shedding new light on the mysteries that surround quantum entanglement and indistin-
guishability at a microscopic level.
5 Identification of entanglement
The presence of entanglement is typically revealed in quantum physics by a violation of Bell-type inequalities
[29, 30], indicating that the corresponding coincidence measurements exhibit correlations that cannot be
modeled in a classical Kolmogorovian probability framework [13, 26].
We recently measured in a cognitive test statistical correlations in the conceptual combination The
Animal Acts. We experimentally found that this combination violates Bell’s inequalities [11, 20] and elab-
orated a model that faithfully represents the collected data in complex Hilbert space [21]. The Animal
Acts unexpectedly revealed the presence of a ‘conceptual entanglement’ which is only partly due to the
component concepts, or ‘state entanglement’, because it is also caused by ‘entangled measurements’ and
‘entangled dynamical evolutions between measurements’ [21]. Our analysis shed new light on the mathe-
matical and conceptual foundations of quantum entanglement, revealing that situations are possible where
only states are entangled and measurements are products (‘customary state entanglement’), but also situ-
ations where entanglement appears on the level of the measurements, in the form of the presence of both
entangled measurements and entangled evolutions (‘nonlocal box situation’, ‘nonlocal non-marginal box
situation’), due to the violation of the marginal distribution law, as in The Animal Acts. More specifi-
cally, The Animal Acts is a paradigmatic example of a ‘nonlocal non-marginal box situation’, that is, an
experimental situation where (i) joint probabilities do not factorize, (ii) Bell’s inequalities are violated, and
(iii) the marginal distribution law does not hold. Whenever these conditions are simultaneously satisfied,
a form of entanglement appears which is stronger than the ‘customarily identified quantum entanglement
in the states of microscopic entities’. In these cases, it is not possible to work out a quantum-mechanical
representation in a fixed C2 ⊗ C2 space which satisfies empirical data and where only the initial state is
entangled while the measurements are products. It follows that entanglement is a more complex property
than usually thought. Shortly, if a single measurement is at play, one can distribute the entanglement
between state and measurement but, if more measurements are considered, the marginal distribution law
imposes limits on the ways to model the presence of the entanglement.
Let us now come to our coincidence measurements eAB , eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ for the conceptual combi-
nation The Animal Acts. In all measurements, we asked subjects to answer the question ‘is a good example
of’ the concept The Animal Acts. In measurement eAB , participants choose among the four possibilities
(1) The Horse Growls, (2) The Bear Whinnies – and if one of these is chosen, the outcome is +1 – and
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Horse Growls Horse Whinnies Bear Growls Bear Whinnies
p(H,G) = 0.049 p(H,W ) = 0.630 p(B,G) = 0.259 p(B,W ) = 0.062
Horse Snorts Horse Meows Bear Snorts Bear Meows
p(H,S) = 0.593 p(H,M) = 0.025 p(B,S) = 0.296 p(B,M) = 0.086
Tiger Growls Tiger Whinnies Cat Growls Cat Whinnies
p(T,G) = 0.778 p(T,W ) = 0.086 p(C,G) = 0.086 p(C,W ) = 0.049
Tiger Snorts Tiger Meows Cat Snorts Cat Meows
p(T, S) = 0.148 p(T,M) = 0.086 p(C,S) = 0.099 p(C,M) = 0.667
Table 1: The data collected in coincidence measurements on entanglement in concepts [20].
(3) The Horse Whinnies, (4) The Bear Growls – and if one of these is chosen, the outcome is −1. In
measurement eAB′ , they choose among (1) The Horse Snorts, (2) The Bear Meows – and in case one of
these is chosen, the outcome is +1 – and (3) The Horse Meows, (4) The Bear Snorts – and in case one of
these is chosen, the outcome is −1. In measurement eA′B , they choose among (1) The Tiger Growls, (2)
The Cat Whinnies – and in case one of these is chosen, the outcome is +1 – and (3) The Tiger Whinnies,
(4) The Cat Growls – and in case one of these is chosen, the outcome is −1. Finally, in measurement eA′B′ ,
participants choose among (1) The Tiger Snorts, (2) The Cat Meows – and in case one of these is chosen,
the outcome is +1 – and (3) The Tiger Meows, (4) The Cat Snorts – and in case one of these is chosen,
the outcome is −1. We evaluate now the expectation values E(A,B), E(A,B′), E(A′, B) and E(A′, B′)
associated with the measurements eAB , eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ respectively, and insert the values into the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) version of Bell’s inequality [30]
− 2 ≤ E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) +E(A,B′)− E(A,B) ≤ 2 (37)
We performed a test on 81 participants who were presented a questionnaire to be filled out in which they
were asked to choose among the above alternatives in eAB, eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ . Table 1 contains the
results of our experiment [20].
If we denote by P (H,G), P (B,W ), P (H,W ) and P (B,G), the probability that The Horse Growls,
The Bear Whinnies, The Horse Whinnies and The Bear Growls, respectively, is chosen in eAB , and so for
in the other measurements, the expectation values are, in the large number limits,
E(A,B) = p(H,G) + p(B,W )− p(B,G)− p(H,W ) = −0.7778
E(A′, B) = p(T,G) + p(C,W )− p(C,G) − p(T,W ) = 0.6543
E(A,B′) = p(H,S) + p(B,M)− p(B,S)− p(H,M) = 0.3580
E(A′, B′) = p(T, S) + p(C,M)− p(C,S) − p(T,M) = 0.6296
Hence, (37) gives
E(A′, B′) +E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) = 2.4197 (38)
which is significantly greater than 2. This implies that (i) it violates Bell’s inequalities, and (ii) the violation
is close the maximal possible violation in quantum theory, i.e. 2 · √2 ≈ 2.8284.
Let us now construct a quantum representation in complex Hilbert space for the collected data by
starting from an operational description of the conceptual entity The Animal Acts. The entity The Animal
Acts is abstractly described by an initial state p. Measurement eAB has four outcomes λHG, λHW , λBG and
λBW , and four final states pHG, pHW , pBG and pBW . Measurement AB
′ has four outcomes λHS , λHM , λBS
and λBM , and four final states pHS , pHM , pBS and pBM . Measurement A
′B has four outcomes λTG, λCG,
λTW and λCW , and four final states pTG, pTW , pCG and pCW . Measurement A
′B′ has four outcomes λTS ,
λCS, λTM and λCM , and four final states pTS , pTM , pCS and pCM . Then, we consider the Hilbert space
C
4 as the state space of The Animal Acts and represent the state p by the unit vector |p〉 ∈ C4. We assume
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that {|pHG〉, |pHW 〉, |pBG〉, |pBW 〉}, {|pHS〉, |pHM 〉, |pBS〉, |pBM 〉}, {|pTG〉, |pTW 〉, |pCG〉, |pCW 〉}, {|pTS〉,
|pTM 〉, |pCS〉, |pCM 〉} are orthonormal (ON) bases of C4. Therefore, |〈pHG|ψ〉|2 = p(H,G), |〈pHW |ψ〉|2 =
p(H,W ), |〈pBG|ψ〉|2 = p(B,G), |〈pBW |ψ〉|2 = p(B,W ), in the measurement eAB . We proceed analogously
for the other probabilities. Hence, the self-adjoint operators
EAB =
∑
i=H,B
∑
j=G,W
λij |pij〉〈pij | (39)
EAB′ =
∑
i=H,B
∑
j=S,M
λij |pij〉〈pij | (40)
EA′B =
∑
i=T,C
∑
j=G,W
λij |pij〉〈pij | (41)
EA′B′ =
∑
i=T,C
∑
j=S,M
λij|pij〉〈pij | (42)
represent the measurements eAB , eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ in C
4, respectively.
Let now the state p of The Animal Acts be the entangled state represented by the unit vector |p〉 =
|0.23ei13.93◦ , 0.62ei16.72◦ , 0.75ei9.69◦ , 0ei194.15◦〉 in the canonical basis of C4. This choice is not arbitrary, but
deliberately ‘as close as possible to a situation of only product measurements’, as we explained in [21].
Moreover, we choose the outcomes λHG = λBW = +1, λHW = λBG = −1, and so on, as in our concrete
experiment. We proved that
EAB =


0.952 −0.207− 0.030i 0.224 + 0.007i 0.003 − 0.006i
−0.207 + 0.030i −0.930 0.028− 0.001i −0.163 + 0.251i
0.224 − 0.007i 0.028 + 0.001i −0.916 −0.193 + 0.266i
0.003 + 0.006i −0.163− 0.251i −0.193 − 0.266i 0.895

 (43)
EAB′ =


−0.001 0.587 + 0.397i 0.555 + 0.434i 0.035 + 0.0259i
0.587− 0.397i −0.489 0.497 + 0.0341i −0.106− 0.005i
0.555− 0.434i 0.497− 0.0341i −0.503 0.045 − 0.001i
0.035− 0.0259i −0.106 + 0.005i 0.045 + 0.001i 0.992

 (44)
EA′B =


−0.587 0.568 + 0.353i 0.274 + 0.365i 0.002 + 0.004i
0.568− 0.353i 0.090 0.681 + 0.263i −0, 110 − 0.007i
0.274− 0.365i 0.681− 0.263i −0.484 0.150− 0.050i
0, 002− 0.004i −0, 110 + 0.007i 0.150 + 0.050i 0.981

 (45)
EA′B′ =


0.854 0.385 + 0.243i −0.035 − 0.164i −0.115− 0.146i
0.385− 0.243i −0.700 0.483 + 0.132i −0.086 + 0.212i
−0.035 + 0.164i 0.483 − 0.132i 0.542 0.093 + 0.647i
−0.115 + 0.146i −0.086− 0.212i 0.093− 0.647i −0.697

 (46)
in this case [21].
This completes the quantum-theoretic modeling in C4 for our cognitive test. One can then resort
to the definitions of entangled states and entangled measurements and to the canonical isomorphisms,
C
4 ∼= C2 ⊗ C2 and L(C4) ∼= L(C2) ⊗ L(C2) (L(H) denotes the vector space of linear operators on the
Hilbert space H), and one can prove that all measurements eAB, eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ are entangled
with this choice of the entangled state p [21]. Moreover, the marginal distribution law is violated by all
measurements, e.g., p(H,G) + p(H,W ) 6= p(H,S) + p(H,M). Since we are below Tsirelson’s bound [31],
this modeling is an example of a ‘nonlocal non-marginal box modeling 1’, following the classification we
proposed in [32].
To conclude the section we remind that we have used the term ‘entanglement’ by explicitly referring
to the structure within the theory of quantum physics that a modeling of experimental data takes, if (i)
these data are represented, following carefully the rules of standard quantum theory, in a complex Hilbert
space, and hence states, measurements, and evolutions, are presented respectively by vectors (or density
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operators), self-adjoint operators, and unitary operators in this Hilbert space; (ii) a situation of coincidence
joint measurement on a compound entity is considered, and the subentities are identified following the tensor
product rule of ‘compound entity description in quantum theory’ (iii) within this tensor product description
of the compound entity entanglement is identified, as ‘not being product’, whether it is for states (non-
product vectors), measurements (non-product self-adjoint operators), or evolutions (non-product unitary
transformations).
6 The quantum nature of conceptual identity
One of the most mysterious and less understood aspects of quantum entities is the way they behave with
respect to ‘identity’, and more specifically their statistical behaviour due to indistinguishability. Indeed,
the statistical behaviour of quantum entities is very different from the statistical behaviour of classical
objects, which are instead, in principle, not identical, hence distinguishable, whenever there is more than
one. The latter is governed by the Maxwell-Boltzmann (MB) distribution, while the former is described
by the Bose-Einstein (BE) distribution for quantum particles with integer spin, and by the Fermi-Dirac
(FD) distribution for quantum particles with semi-integer spin (we omit considering fractional statistical
particles here, for the sake of brevity) [34, 35].
What about concepts? Consider, e.g., the linguistic expression “eleven animals”. This expression,
when both “eleven” and “animals” are looked upon with respect to their conceptual structure, represents
the combination of concepts Eleven and Animals into Eleven Animals, which is again a concept. Each
of the Eleven Animals is then completely identical on this conceptual level, and hence indistinguishable.
The same linguistic expression can however also elicit the thought about eleven objects, present in space
and time, each of them being an instantiation of Animal, and thus distinguishable from each other. We
recently inquired into experiments on such combinations of concepts, surprisingly finding that BE statistics
appears at an empirical level for specific types of concepts, hence finding strong evidence for the hypothesis
that indeed there is a profound connection between the behavior of concepts with respect to identity and
indistinguishability and the behaviour of quantum entities with respect to these notions [22]. What is
interesting in this respect is that we can intuitively understand the behavior of concepts with respect to
identity and indistinguishability, which means that it might well be that an understanding of the behavior
of quantum entities with respect to identity and indistinguishability should be searches for by making use
of this analogy. In this sense, that identical concepts can be modeled exactly as identical quantum entities,
i.e. by using quantum theory, is not only a strong achievement for quantum cognition, but it might also
incorporate a new way to reflect about this mysterious behaviour of identical quantum entities.
Let us discuss these aspects both at a theoretic and an empirical level, as follows.
Let us firstly consider the SCoP structure in Section 2 and two states of Animal, namely Cat and Dog,
hence the situation where Eleven Animals can be either Cats or Dogs. Then, the conceptual meaning of
Eleven Animals, which can be Cats or Dogs, gives rise in a unique way to twelve possible states. Let us
denote them by p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10 and p0,11, and they stand respectively for Eleven Cats (and no dogs),
Ten Cats And One Dog, . . . , One Cat And Ten Dogs and Eleven Dogs (and no cats). We investigated the
‘probabilities of change of the ground state pˆ of the combined concept Eleven Animals into one of the twelve
states p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10 and p0,11’ in a cognitive experiment on human subjects. The subjects were
presented the twelve states and asked to choose their preferred one. The relative frequency arising from
their answers was interpreted as the probability of change of the ground state pˆ, to the chosen state, i.e.
one of the set {p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}. The context e involved in this experiment is mainly determined
by the ‘combination procedure of the concepts Eleven and Animals’ and the ‘meaning contained in the
new combination’ for participants in the experiment [15]. Hence, our psychological experiment tested
whether participants follow the ‘conceptual meaning’ of Eleven Animals treating Dogs (Cats) as identical,
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or participants follow the ‘instantiations into objects meaning’ of Eleven Animals treating Dogs (Cats) as
distinguishable.
We mathematically represent the conceptual entity Eleven Animals by the SCoP model (Σ,M, µ),
where Σ = {pˆ, p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}, M = {e}, and our transition probabilities are {µ(q, e, pˆ) |q ∈
{p11,0, p10,1, . . . , p1,10, p0,11}}. We recognise in the structure of µ(q, e, pˆ) the situation is analogous to the
one in which one has N = 11 particles that can be distributed in M = 2 possible states. It is thus
possible, by looking at the relative frequencies obtained in the experiment, to find out whether a classical
MB statistics or a quantum-type, i.e. BE statistics, applies to this situation. In case that MB would
apply, it would mean that things happen as if there are underlying the twelve states hidden possibilities,
namely T (n,C; 11 − n,D) = 11!/n!(11 − n)! in number, for the specific state of n Cats and 11 − n Dogs,
n = 0, . . . , 11. Of course, this “is” true in case the cats and dogs are real cats and dogs, hence are ‘objects
existing in space and time’, which is why for objects in the classical world indeed MB statistics applies.
Let us calculate the probabilities involved then. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that two probability
values PCat and PDog exist such that PCat + PDog = 1, and that the events of making actual such an
underlying state for Cat and Dog are independent. Hence the probability for n exemplars of Cat and 11−n
exemplars of Dog is then
µ
PCat,PDog
MB (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) = T (n,C; 11− n,D)PnCatP 11−nDog =
11!
n!(11− n)!P
n
CatP
11−n
Dog (47)
Note that, under the assumption of MB statistics, µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p, e, pˆ) becomes the binomial probability
distribution. For example, if PDog = PCat = 0.5, the number of possible arrangements for the state
Eleven Cats And Zero Dogs and for the state Zero Cats And Eleven Dogs is 1, hence the corresponding
probability for these configurations is µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p0,11, e, pˆ) = µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p11,0, e, pˆ) = 0.0005. Analogously,
the number of possible arrangements for the state Ten Cats And One Dog and for the state One Cat And
Ten Dogs is 11, hence the corresponding probability for these configurations is µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p10,1, e, pˆ) =
µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p1,10, e, pˆ) = 0.0054, and so on. When PCat and PDog are equal, MB distribution entails a
maximum value for such a probability. In this example, this corresponds to the situation of Six Cats And
Five Dogs and Five Cats And Six Dogs with µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p6,5, e, pˆ) = µ
PCat,PDog
MB (p6,5, e, pˆ) = 0.2256.
Let us now make the calculation for BE statistics, where we keep making the exercise of only reasoning
on the level of concepts, and not on the level of instantiations. This means that the twelve different states
do not admit underlying hidden states, because the existence of such states would mean that we reason on
more concrete forms in the direction of instantiations. As above, we suppose that Cat and Dog have an
independent elicitation probability PCat and PDog such that PCat + PDog = 1. Hence, the probability that
there are n exemplars of Cat and (11− n) exemplars of Dog is
µ
PCat,PDog
BE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) =
(nPcat + (11− n)Pdog)
(12×112 )
(48)
Note that as PCat = 1 − PDog, then µPCat,PDogBE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ) is a linear function. Moreover, when PCat =
PDog = 0.5, we have that µBE(pn,11−n, e, pˆ) = 1/12 for all values of n, thus recovering BE distribution [22].
Starting from the above theoretic analysis, if one performs experiments on a collection of concepts like
Eleven Animals to estimate the probability of elicitation for each state, then one can establish whether a
distribution of MB-type µ
PCat,PDog
MB (pn,11−n, e, pˆ), or of BE-type µ
PCat,PDog
BE (pn,11−n, e, pˆ), or a different one,
holds. However, in case there are strong deviations from a MB statistics, while a quasi-linear distribution
is obtained, then this would indicate that, in context e, where only Cat and Dog are allowed to be states of
the concept Animal, the statistical distribution of the collection of concepts Eleven Animals is of a BE-type
and that concepts present a quantum-type indistinguishability.
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We performed a cognitive experiment with 88 participants. We considered a list of concepts Ai of
different (physical and non-physical) nature, i = 1, . . . , 14, and two possible exemplars (states) pi1 and
pi2 for each concept. Next we requested participants to choose one exemplar of a combination N
iAi of
concepts, where N i is a natural number. The exemplars of these combinations of concepts Ai are the
states pi
k,N i−k describing the conceptual combination ‘k exemplars in state p
i
1 and (N
i − k) exemplars
in state pi2’, where k is an integer such that k = 0, . . . , N
i. For example, the first collection of concepts
we considered is N1A1 corresponding to the compound conceptual entity Eleven Animals, with pi1 and
pi2 describing the exemplars Cat and Dog of the individual concept Animal, respectively, and N
1 = 11.
The exemplars (states) we considered are thus p111,0, p
1
10,1, . . . , p
1
1,10, and p
1
0,11, describing the combination
Eleven Cats And Zero Dogs, Ten Cats And One Dog, . . . , One Cat And Ten Dogs, and Zero Cats And
Eleven Dogs. The other collections of concepts we considered in our cognitive experiment are reported in
Table 2.
i N i Ai pi1 p
i
2
1 11 Animals Cat Dog
2 9 Humans Man Woman
3 8 Expressions of Emotion Laugh Cry
4 7 Expressions of Affection Kiss Hug
5 11 Moods Happy Sad
6 8 Parts of Face Nose Chin
7 9 Movements Step Run
8 11 Animals Whale Condor
9 9 Humans Child Elder
10 8 Expressions of Emotion Sigh Moan
11 7 Expressions of Affection Caress Present
12 11 Moods Thoughtful Bored
13 8 Parts of Face Eye Cheek
14 9 Movements Jump Crawl
Table 2: List of concepts and their respective states for the psychological concept on identity and indistinguishability.
We computed the parameters PMB
pi
1
and PBE
pi
1
that minimize the the R-squared value of the fit using
the distributions µ
P
pi
1
,P
pi
2
MB and µ
P
pi
1
,P
pi
2
BE for each i = 1, . . . , 14. Hence, we fitted the distributions obtained
in the psychological experiments using MB and BE statistics (note that only one parameter is needed as
PMB
pi
2
= 1 − PMB
pi
1
and PBE
pi
2
= 1 − PBE
pi
1
). Next, we used the ‘Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)’ [38]
to estimate which model provides the best fit and contrast this criterion with the R-squared value. Table
3 summarizes the statistical analysis. The first column of the table identifies the concept in question (see
Table 2), the second and third columns show PMB
pi
1
and the R2 value of the MB statistical fit, the fourth
and fifth columns show PBE
pi
1
and the R2 value of the BE statistical fit. The sixth column shows the ∆BIC
criterion to discern between the µ
P
pi
1
P
pi
2
MB and µ
P
pi
1
P
pi
2
BE , and the seventh column identifies the distribution
which best fits the data for concept Ai, i = 1, . . . , 14.
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i PMB
pi
1
R2MB P
BE
pi
1
R2BE ∆BIC Best Model
1 0.55 -0.05 0.16 0.78 19.31 BE strong
2 0.57 0.78 0.42 0.44 -9.54 MB strong
3 0.82 0.29 0.96 0.79 10.81 BE strong
4 0.71 0.81 0.53 0.77 -1.69 MB weak
5 0.25 0.79 0.39 0.93 14.27 BE strong
6 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.57 -0.37 MB weak
7 0.72 0.41 0.64 0.83 12.66 BE strong
8 0.63 0.58 0.47 0.73 5.53 BE positive
9 0.45 0.87 0.26 0.67 -9.69 MB strong
10 0.59 0.50 0.63 0.77 7.17 BE positive
11 0.86 0.46 1.00 0.87 11.4 BE strong
12 0.21 0.77 0.00 0.87 6.68 BE positive
13 0.62 0.54 0.71 0.67 2.97 BE weak
14 0.81 0.20 0.91 0.90 20.68 BE strong
Table 3: Results of statistical fit for the psychological experiment. Each column refers to the 14 collections of concepts
introduced in Table 2.
Note that, according to the BIC criteria, negative ∆BIC values imply that the category is best fitted
by a MB distribution, whereas positive ∆BIC values on row i imply the concept A
i is best fitted with
a BE distribution. Moreover, when |∆BIC| < 2 there is no clear difference between the models, when
2 < |∆BIC| < 6 we can establish a positive but not strong difference towards the model with smallest value,
whereas when 6 < |∆BIC| we are in presence of strong evidence that one of the models provides better fit
than the other model [38]. We see that categories 2 and 9 show a strong ∆BIC value towards MB-type of
statistics, and that categories 1, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12 and 14 show a strong ∆BIC value towards BE-type of statistics.
Complementary to the BIC criterion, the R2 fit indicator helps to see whether or not the indications of
∆BIC can be confirmed with a good fit of the data. Interestingly, the concepts we have identified with
strong indication towards one type of statistics have R2 values larger than 0.78 (such R2 values are marked
in bold text), which indicates a fairly good approximation for the data. Moreover, note that in all the cases
with strong tendency towards one type of statistics, the R2 of the other type of statistics shows is poor.
This confirms the fact that we can discern between the two types of statistics depending on the concept in
question.
The interpretation of our results is thus clear. Conceptual combinations exists, like Nine Humans, whose
distribution follows MB statistics. However, also conceptual combinations, like Eleven Animals, Eight
Expressions of Emotion or Eleven Moods, whose distribution follows BE statistics exist. The conclusion is
that the nature of identity in these concept combinations is of a quantum-type and in these combinations
the human mind treats the two states we consider as identical and indistinguishable. Also the hypothesis
that ‘the more easy the human mind imagines spontaneously instantiations, e.g., Nine Humans, the more
MB, and the less easy such instantiations are activated in imagination, e.g., Eight Expressions of Emotion,
the more BE statistics appears’ is confirmed by our experiment.
We have an intuitive explanation for this empirical difference. Whenever the human mind ‘imagines’
two different combinations of Eleven Animals, say 2 cats and 9 dogs, and 5 cats and 6 dogs, the human
mind does not really take into account that this situation can be about real cats and dogs, in which case
there are many more ways to put 5 cats and 6 dogs into a cage, than to put 2 cats and 9 dogs. This is
the reason why BE, not MB, appears in this case. Suppose instead that the human mind considers two
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different combinations of Nine Humans, say 2 elders and 7 children, and 4 elders and 5 children. Then the
human mind is likely to be influenced by real known families with 9 sons and, in the real world, there are
much more situations of families with 4 elders and 5 children, than 2 elders and 7 children.
This pattern was confirmed by a second experiment we performed on the World-Wide Web about the
nature of conceptual indistinguishability [22].
7 Concluding remarks and perspectives
In the previous sections we have provided an overview of our quantum-theoretic perspective on concepts
and their combinations. We have expounded the reasons that led us to develop this perspective, namely
our former research on operational and axiomatic approaches to quantum physics, the origins of quantum
probability and various experimental results in cognition pointing to a deviation of human reasoning from
the structures of classical (fuzzy set) and classical probability theory. We have proved that these deviations
can be described in terms of genuine quantum effects, such as contextuality, emergence, interference and
superposition. We have identified further quantum aspects in the mechanisms of conceptual combination,
namely entanglement and quantum-type indistinguishability. And, we have proposed an explanation that
allows the unification of these different empirical results under a common underlying principle on the
structure of human thought.
Our quantum-theoretic perspective fits the global research domain that applies the mathematical for-
malisms of quantum theory in cognitive science and has been called ‘quantum cognition’ (we quote here
some known books on this flourishing domain [39, 40, 41]). Further, we believe that our findings in cog-
nition may also have, as a feedback, a deep impact on the foundations of microscopic quantum physics.
Indeed, let us consider entanglement. We identified in concepts an entanglement situation where Bell’s
inequalities are violated within Tsirelson’s bound [31], the marginal distribution law is violated and there
is ‘no signaling’, which implies that entangled measurements, in addition to entangled states, are needed to
model this experimental situation. And this completely occurs within a Hilbert space quantum framework,
at variance with widespread beliefs. This theoretic scheme with entangled measurements could explain
some ‘anomalies’, i.e. deviations from the marginal distribution law, that were recently observed in the
typical Bell-type nonlocality tests with entangled photons [42, 43]. Then, let us consider the quantum
nature of conceptual indistinguishability. In our perspective, it is due to the human mind being able to
consider specific conceptual entitites without the need to also imagine instantiations as objects existing
in space and time of these conceptual entities. Hence, it could well be that quantum indistinguishability
at a microscopic level is provoked by the fact that quantum entitites are not localized as objects in space
and time, and that non-locality would mean non-spatiality, a view that has been put forward by one of us
in earlier work for different reasons [33]. These insights could for example have implications on quantum
statistics and the so-called ‘spin-statistics theorem’ [34, 35].
We conclude this article with an epistemological consideration. We think that our quantum-theoretic
perspective in concept theory constitutes a step towards the construction of a general theory for the
modeling of conceptual entities. In this sense, we distinguish it from what is typically considered as an ad
hoc cognitive model. To understand what we mean by this distinction let us consider an example taken
from everyday life. As an example of a theory, we could introduce the theory of ‘how to make good clothes’.
A tailor needs to learn how to make good clothes for different types of people, men, women, children, old
people, etc. Each cloth is a model on itself. Then, one can also consider intermediate situations where one
has models of series of clothes. A specific body will not fit in any clothes: you need to adjust the parameters
(length, size, etc.) to reach the desired fit. We think that a theory should be able to reproduce different
experimental results by suitably adjusting the involved parameters, exactly as a theory of clothing. This is
different from a set of ad hoc models, even if the set can cope with a wide range of experimental data. There
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is a tendency in psychology to be critical for a theory that can cope with all possible situations it applies
to. One then often believes that the theory contains too many parameters, and that it is only by allowing
all these parameters to attain different values that all the data can be modeled. In case we have to do with
an ad hoc model, i.e, a model specially made for the circumstance of the situation it models, this suspicion
is grounded. Adding parameters to such an ad hoc model, or stretching the already contained parameters
to other values, does not give rise to what we call a theory. A theory needs to be well defined, its rules,
the allowed procedures, its theoretical, mathematical, and internal logical structure, ‘independent’ of the
structure of the models describing specific situations that can be coped with by the theory. Hence also the
theory needs to contain a well defined description of ‘how to produce models for specific situations’. Think
again of the theory of clothing. If a taylor knows the theory of clothing, obviously he or she can make a
cloth for every human body, because the theory of clothing, although its structure is defined independently
of a specific clothe, contains a prescription of how to apply it to any possible specific cloth. Other subtle
aspects are involved with the differences between ad hoc models and models finding their origin in a theory
[36]. Here we mainly wanted to bring up the issue, because we think it does lead to misunderstandings not
to pay attention to the difference between an ad hoc model, and a model which is derived from a theory.
Intuitive thoughts about the nature of a model differ often depending on whether the model is inspired by
a psychology approach, it will then rather automatically been looked upon as an ad hoc model, and that
all data can be modelled is the suspicious, or whether it is inspired by a physics approach, where it will
rather be looked upon as resulting from a theory, and that all data can be modeled by it is the a positive
aspect, validating the theory.
What is the status of the Fock space model for concept combinations? Hilbert space, hence also Fock
space when appropriate, for the description of quantum entities provides models that definitely come from
a theory, namely quantum theory, and hence are not ad hoc models. Is quantum theory also a theory
for concepts and their combinations, and hence, if so, can we consider our models, e.g. the Fock space
model, as models coming from this theory? Or is quantum cognition rather still a discipline where ad hoc
models are built, making use, also in a rather ad hoc way, of mathematics arising from quantum theory?
An answer to this question can not yet been given definitely, but some hypothesis can be formulated with
plausibility in respect to it. We believe that, notwithstanding their deep analogies, concept entities are
less crystalized and symmetric structures than quantum entities. As a matter of fact some data in [4, 5]
and [6, 7] cannot be modeled in Fock space, and further experimental findings could in the future confirm
such impossibility. Notwithstanding this, we believe that emergence is the actual driver also for these data
that cannot be modeled in Fock space. But, this type of emergence cannot be represented in a linear
Hilbert (Fock) space, and more general structures are needed. The search for more general mathematical
structures capturing conceptual emergence will, by the way, constitute an important aspect of our future
investigation in concept theory. On the other hand, we do believe that we have arrived in the realm of
building models that come from a theory, and are not ad hoc. Indeed, although we believe that this theory
will turn out to be a generalisation of the actual quantum theory, its basic principles – except linearity
most probably – will be present in the generalised quantum theory too. We have recently worked out an
analysis where the view of the status of actual quantum cognition, as describing a quantum-like domain
of reality, less crystallised than the micro-world, but containing deep analogies in its foundations, is put
forward [37].
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